10 statements
 
Paul Stubbs, 23.04.2009.
1. The crisis may represent a paradox in terms of the end of neo-liberal globalization AND the beginning of neo-liberal restructuring in the Western Balkans.

 
2. The crisis will affect differently different parts of the region, depending on the degree and nature of their integration in European markets in terms of FDI, trade, remittances and banking sector ownership.
 
3. There is an assymetrical process at work in terms of the ability of strong, richer economies (USA, Germany, UK) to spend their way out of recession and the impossibility of this in the Western Balkans.
 
4. The European Union is unlikely to play a particularly constructive role in the region but could introduce important measures such as including the entire region in the Euro-zone and creating visa-free travel.
 
5. Levels of poverty and of unemployment will rise in the region, although probably less than some CEE EU member states and parts of the former Soviet Union.
 
6. Anti-recession measures have been too ad hoc, too late, and too economistic. In addition, most of them are regressive rather than progressive in terms of increasing inequality and disproportionately placing the burden on the bottom 20% of the population.
 
7. Cuts in public expenditure appear likely to protect those groups with more political muscle, leaving parts of the traditonal, so-called 'undeserving poor' worse off. There is almost no capacity to make 'smart' social policy to offer a spingboard back to sustainable livelihoods for the 'new poor'.
 
8. In the past, crises have often led to new social contracts, a greater focus on social inclusion, and new social rights. In the Western Balkans, the current crisis is more likely to lead to greater individualism, more commodification of basic services, and a new race to the welfare bottom, with certain privileged groups protected and others left with little or categorised as 'dangerous' rather than 'in need'.
 
9. The ways in which households, local communities, networks, and social movements respond to the crisis will be crucial both directly in terms of social impacts and indirectly in terms of new possibilities for a progressive political economy. NGOs as service providers and/or as a charitable substitute for basic services are not the answer.
 
10. The crisis will change fundamentally age and gender relations in the region, will create ever more spatial differences between 'zones of inclusion and exclusion', and may create a semi-permenant underclass.